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Abstract. This article describes some problems with a recent analysis of global terrorism issued by the 
United States Department of State. 
 
The United States (US) Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism has recently been issued to 
shed light on what some term a scourge for human civilization. Yet the report may provide neither light 
nor heat. 
 
One conclusion of the report is that there has been a significant shift from state-sponsored terrorism to 
terrorism sponsored by "far-flung and loosely structured webs of terror." Is this really the case? State-
sponsored terrorism has long developed, nurtured, and supported webs of terror--far flung, loosely 
structured, and otherwise. This state sponsorship has been overt, covert, and clandestine. So what has 
changed? Are states less in the terrorism business than before? Are they covering their tracks in a more 
sophisticated fashion? Here the report is not helpful. 
 
Another conclusion of the report is that there has been a shift from politically motivated terrorism to 
terrorism motivated by religion and ideology. But is not political motivation imbued with ideology and is 
not ideology constituted with a political world view and a political world even beyond the material 
world? And does not a religious belief structure qualify as well as ideology--an ideology that impels 
political belief and action? As well, does not any political ideology serve the purpose to varying degrees 
of a religion in and of the material world? Moreover, the report does not even cover the psychological 
fact that some significant portion of terrorists act purely out of malign affective complexes of revenge 
and hatred--others out of the desire for pure economic profit or even a sense of cultural relativism and 
nihilism. So what--if anything--has really changed? 
 
A third conclusion is that the primary source of terrorist threat to the US seems to be located in the 
Middle East. Yet quantitative research suggests that specific terrorist attacks to US targets have 
occurred more often outside the Middle East. This may suggest that the primary source is still the 
Middle East but the source's agents operate elsewhere. However--as far as can be determined from 
unclassified data--the sources of acts effected elsewhere often seem to be located regionally proximal 
to the acts. Alternatively, has the US been much more successful at preventing terrorist acts whose 
origins lie in the Middle East? But this is an hypothesis that requires corroboration. 
 
One could conclude from analyzing the report's conclusions that little has changed or even that little is 
accurate. Why might this be? Reports on terrorism help us manage terror. That is, the very act of 
providing conclusions about a phenomenon can seem to render that phenomenon easier to control and 
manage and influence. Unfortunately, success in the latter can render terrorism more successful--i.e., 
with the seeds of psychological victory one may reap physical defeat. (See Florian, V., & Mikulincer, M. 
(1997). Fear of death and the judgment of social transgressions: A multidimensional test of terror 
management theory. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 73, 369-380; On-the-Record Briefing on 
the 1999 Annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" Report. (May 1, 2000). As released by the Office of the 
Spokesman, U.S. Department of State at 
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http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000501a.html; Patterns of Global Terrorism. (April 
2000). Department of State Publication 10687 at 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/1999index.html; Pyszczynski, T., & 
Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1997). Why do we need what we need? A terror management perspective 
on the roots of human social motivation. Psychological Inquiry, 8, 1-20; Wicklund, R. (1997). Terror 
management accounts of other theories: Questions for the cultural worldview concept. Psychological 
Inquiry, 8, 54-58.) (Keywords: Terrorism; United States Department of State.) 
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